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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 17-1603

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MATTHEW WILLIAMS, a/k/a FLEA
Matthew Williams,
Appellant
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-15-cr-00471-003)
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 23, 2018
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and SILER, Jr. ♦, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 1, 2018)
OPINION *

♦

Honorable Senior Judge Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Circuit Court Judge for the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Matthew Williams was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute cocaine
base and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, distribution of cocaine base in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Williams argues on appeal the
District Court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal because
there was insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy and the firearm offense. He
also contends the Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during
the execution of a search warrant at the house in which he was sleeping. 1
We review de novo the Court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of
acquittal, and we apply the same standard as the District Court. United States v. Bobb,
471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006). Our review of the sufficiency of evidence is highly
deferential, and we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). The question we answer is whether
any rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury and found proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 7 (2011) (per curiam). In light of this
highly deferential standard, we hold there was sufficient evidence for Williams’s
conspiracy and firearm convictions and the District Court did not err in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal.

1

We have jurisdiction over final decisions of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

To support the conspiracy charge, the Government introduced evidence that
Williams and his co-defendants operated from two of the same houses (one was the house
at which he was later found during the execution of a search warrant) and they made
deals using the same cell phone. While this is only circumstantial evidence of a
conspiracy, a reasonable trier of fact could find it establishes Williams’s unity of purpose
with his co-conspirators, his intent to achieve a common goal, and his agreement to work
together toward that goal. See United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2008).
With respect to the firearm offense, the Government’s evidence included:
Williams’s drug dealing from the house where he and the handgun and shotgun were
found; an officer’s testimony that he admitted a handgun found during the search was his;
his effort to hide the handgun in a ventilation shaft; that Williams and his family were the
only people in the house at the time of the search; that both guns were loaded with live
ammunition; and that the shotgun was in plain view near a ballistic vest and drug
paraphernalia. Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably find Williams knowingly
possessed the guns and his possession was in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See
United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing constructive
possession); United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 2004) (setting out
eight-factor test for determining whether possession of a firearm is “in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime”).
We also hold the Court did not err in denying Williams’s suppression motion. We
review de novo its denial of Williams’s motion to suppress, and we apply the same
standard as the District Court to determine whether the magistrate who issued the warrant
3

had a “substantial basis” for determining probable cause existed. United States v.
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 2002). Williams argues the search warrant for
the house at which he was sleeping was facially deficient because it failed to specify the
location to be searched and the items to be seized. He also argues for the first time on
appeal the warrant failed to specify his identity and his connection to the location. But
the warrant contained the specific address of the house, an exhaustive list of items
(including weapons, drugs, and drug paraphernalia), and it named Williams as an owner,
occupant, or possessor of the property. Hence, as required under Maryland v. Garrison,
480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987), it “particularly describe[ed] the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.” Id.
For these reasons, we affirm.
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